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Preface
This report is about the idea of public equity, and provides a model for how it might 
work in New Zealand. Public equity is the recognition that a substantial share of national 
income is inherently public because it derives from capitals that are public – such as 
intellectual, socio-cultural, and natural capital – or have public elements. Manufactured 
capital, for example, includes a nation’s physical infrastructure. Just as these capitals are 
publicly ‘owned’, some of the income generated by these capitals could also be distrib-
uted equally to all citizens of a society, as a dividend.
The public equity concept addresses some current problems with income distribution 
and the welfare state. By rethinking income taxation as public revenue resulting from 
those capitals that are in the public domain, we avoid the libertarian notion of taxation 
as the theft of private wealth. The distribution suggested in this report, in the form of a 
public equity dividend, would help ensure the capacity of ordinary citizens to spend, 
as capitalism requires them to do, and lessen the need for private debt to fund their 
spending. It would also maintain a more elastic labour supply – people could work 
shorter hours in normal times, and longer hours in times of emergency, incentivised if 
necessary by changing tax rates or dividend amounts. This balanced work pattern is the 
key to sustainability of the natural environment, as well as the sustainability of capitalism. 
The model I propose in this report has a single tax rate, which makes domestic tax 
avoidance more difficult as differences in tax rates cannot be exploited. 
The current welfare system is beset by conditionality and high effective marginal tax 
rates, which amount to a ‘poverty trap’. Public equity dividends would reduce the 
number of people requiring welfare payments. The dividends are also labour-enabling; 
unlike targeted transfers, they cannot be withdrawn or reduced when a person gains 
casual or permanent employment. 
Public equity gives citizens more scope in their work-leisure trade-offs. Governments 
can adjust the core fiscal parameters – income tax rate and dividend amount – to ensure 
that nobody is left behind, and that nobody is pressured to enter into exploitative labour 
contracts or self-employment in the criminal economy. Basic income security in high 
productivity societies is neither unaffordable nor a luxury: the public equity mechanism 
can create a citizen-centred economy that meets the distributional challenges of rising 
economic productivity.
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1. Introduction
It is easily affordable, in 2017 or 2018, for New Zealanders to pay 33 percent income 
tax and receive an unconditional public equity dividend of $175 per week. For a 
majority of New Zealanders, their incomes would be unchanged. For most of the rest, 
there would be only a small increase in their incomes. What would change, radically, 
is the way New Zealanders think about taxes and benefits. Such a change in thinking 
opens the door to constructive, equitable and consensual future changes to taxes and 
benefits. This report explains the conceptual leap involved in a public equity-centred 
tax-benefit reform. I demonstrate a staged change to this model of public accounting 
and income.
A social welfare problem has existed in accentuated form in New Zealand since the 
1991 ‘Mother of All Budgets’. The problem is essentially an array of increasingly 
conditional (and bureaucratic) transfer benefits that barely sustain only a basic income 
safety net. In reality, these benefits have formed an ever-tightening ‘poverty trap’. 
1991 was also the year I first wrote about the Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a core 
universal adult benefit that could be achieved in New Zealand through a process of 
tax reform.1  By that time, few people remembered the humiliating terms under which 
social assistance was available during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the 
resulting rhetoric of universal social security that gained the Labour Party its first ever 
electoral success in 1935. The provision of truly universal benefits began with the 
introduction of Universal Superannuation from 1940. It was more policy pragmatism 
than Labour’s political ideology that ushered in New Zealand’s universal welfare 
state following the passing of the 1938 Social Security Act.2  Historians continue to 
acknowledge the universal welfare state as one of New Zealand’s greatest political 
achievements, but in the 1980s and 1990s both Labour and National governments 
set about disestablishing it. Universal welfare provision became vulnerable to attack 
partly because of its political roots in a sort of ‘pragmatic idealism’ rather than through 
the reasoned application of equity principles. 
Public equity is an important concept – a missing principle – that can fruitfully inform 
contemporary discussions relating to tax and benefit reform. Indeed, in a more 
general sense, it’s a concept needed to advance discussions about capitalism 
itself. For capitalism to have a benign future – as suggested by Winston Peters3  - 
an inclusive vision of public property rights needs to be embedded into the 
conversation. Public equity represents a way of understanding – and accounting for 
1 Rankin (1991). See the Appendix for why I no longer favour the name ‘Universal Basic Income’. See also 
Susan St John, in conjunction with Anne Heynes or myself (1993, 1998, 2002, 2009), on the increasing 
benefit disentitlements and benefit cuts that began in the 1980s.
2 Hanson (1980) reveals the convoluted politics that could have easily led, instead, to either an extension of 
targeted welfare or the introduction of a contribution-based social insurance scheme. 
3 “We believe capitalism must regain its human face”, from Peters’ announcement that the New Zealand First 
Party would form a coalition government with the New Zealand Labour Party (New Zealand Herald, October 
19, 2017). 
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– public finance; a way that underpins a universalist approach to the achievement 
of societal equity without compromising economic efficiency. This equity-based 
approach to income distribution contrasts with the more familiar (and arbitrary) 
redistributive tax-and-transfer approach.4  It also contrasts with the insurance-based 
approach to social welfare, where benefits are linked to prior contributions. Public 
equity introduces public property rights into tax and income distribution policy.
Public equity is the idea that a substantial share of national income is inherently 
public,5  and that the public share should be allocated equally to all economic 
citizens6  of that society. Of the six capitals – financial, manufactured, human, 
intellectual, socio-cultural, and natural – that enable economic productivity, the last 
three are inherently public, and the others have public elements. Manufactured 
capital, for example, includes a nation’s physical infrastructure.7 Just as these capitals 
are publicly ‘owned’, the income generated by these capitals is also owned by the 
public; I argue they should be distributed equitably to the public, too.
Consequently, in a series of articles, book chapters, and presentations since 2009, I 
have discussed how, practically, public equity dividends – as a core component of a 
reform of income taxes and benefits – are equivalent to a Universal Basic Income (UBI). 
The term ‘Universal Basic Income’ has become increasingly ambiguous, however. 
Some understandings of the UBI require that it be a dividend high enough to be an 
alternative, rather than a complement, to market income. Another understanding is 
that a UBI necessarily displaces all social assistance in the form of transfer benefits. 
For this reason, I favour the more inclusive term public equity dividend. It is an amount 
– any amount – that is paid, from public revenue, in equal measure to all economic 
citizens of a sovereign nation.8  
Implementation of a public equity dividend starts with accounting reform – that is, 
reform that opens the door to a future that does not require there to be poverty in 
a high-productivity society. The constraint to this reform is not a lack of money, but 
a lack of imagination. For too many, public equity remains a concept beyond the 
‘adjacent possible’.9  
4 Castles (1985) dates the beginnings of a welfare state for workers in Australia and New Zealand from 
around 1890, based very much on ‘selective’ (i.e. targeted) support to deserving working class men and 
their families. Thus, the development of a universalist approach in New Zealand in the 1930s was very much 
a break from this earlier Australasian tradition. 
5 National income is essentially the same entity as GDP (gross domestic product), though seen from the 
point of view of ‘who gets it’ rather than ‘what’s in it’. Common metaphors include the ‘economic cake’ and 
‘economic pie’. 
6 While the definition of the term economic citizenship is open, I use the term to refer to anyone who would 
qualify for a public equity dividend. The precise qualifying criteria should be worked out by legislators. 
Economic citizens should be adults, however adulthood is defined, and ideally every adult in the world 
would be an economic citizen of one (and only one) sovereign nation. Being an economic citizen is not tied 
to an individual’s economic contribution. 
7 Jane Gleeson-White (2014). Six Capitals. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
8 Other forms of equity dividend are also possible. In addition to company dividends, the ‘bread and butter’ 
of capitalism, a form in New Zealand could be an Iwi Equity Dividend (Rankin 2016b). For more information 
about why I no longer favour the name ‘Universal Basic Income’, see Appendix. 
9 Johnson (2013) discusses how important ideas that seem obvious to us today were far from obvious in the 
past, essentially because the key imaginative breakthroughs had not been made. 
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In this report, I specify the principal steps of the required policy reform process, a 
process that starts with accounting changes, and then opens up a pathway through 
which economic success can be enjoyed by all, not just a diminishing few.
Public equity dividends – unlike targeted transfers – cannot be withdrawn or reduced 
when a person gains some (or more) employment. Accordingly, they are labour-
enabling. That contrasts with the caricature of a UBI as a benefit that specifically 
encourages people to withdraw from the workforce, choosing to survive on public 
largesse - a form of ‘moral hazard’.
While the size of the public share of national income should be set (and reset) 
through the democratic process, when we apply equity principles to public finance 
the public share in New Zealand is larger than conventional reporting suggests. 
2. Gross Public Revenue – the Public Equity Fund
In New Zealand’s case, we can tease out an implicit ‘public equity fund’ – the true 
public share of national income – from a careful examination of income taxes. The 
rate that has anchored New Zealand’s income tax since 1988 is 33 percent (33 cents 
in the dollar). This rate has underpinned New Zealand’s income tax code by being 
the normal top statutory rate. This means that other statutory rates can be considered 
concessionary (if lower than the 33% anchor rate) or (if higher than the 33% anchor 
rate) only aimed at a small elite group of very high earners. If we apply the 33% rate 
to GDP (gross domestic product) – which is the market aggregation that represents 
a nation’s tax base – and then add all elements of public revenue (especially indirect 
taxes) that cannot be categorised as income tax, we have a gross measure of public 
revenue that may be described as the public equity fund.10 Gross public revenue 
may then be allocated four ways: spending on collective goods and services (such as 
education, defence); redistributive transfer payments (commonly known as welfare 
benefits and tax credits); debt servicing (especially for past public investment in 
physical infrastructure provision); and public equity dividends (analogous to the 
dividends companies pay their shareholders).11 In addition, in some years there may 
be a fiscal surplus (unallocated public revenue); in other years, a fiscal deficit.
At present, New Zealand – and other countries – have no explicit public dividends. 
So, the dividend component of public revenue allocation is presently zero. However, 
there is an implicit public dividend like distribution, and has been (in its present 
10 Refer Table 3 below. 
11 In regard to debt-servicing, the general capitalist principle (when applied to government) is that 
government consumption – spending by government at any level on collective goods and services – should 
be funded from current revenue, while government investment should be funded (as debt servicing) from 
revenue collected over the productive life of each completed project.
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form) at least since 1988.12 For some, the implicit public dividend comes through 
the unconditional concessions – that is, the benefits which arise from concessionary 
marginal tax rates – that are contained in the published income tax scales.  For others, 
it arises from the welfare safety-net principle: that every economic citizen should have 
access to some minimum level of provision. The safety-net principle underpins mid 
late twentieth century orthodoxy and is manifest in benefits, tax credits, supplements 
or student allowances that are individually accounted for as conditional transfers. 
For many – especially lower income workers – their implicit public dividends come 
as a mix of unconditional tax concessions and conditional transfers. It is important to 
note that dividends – including public equity dividends – represent income returns 
to capital (owning); in contrast to wages and salaries, which are returns to labour 
(working).
From this consideration of benefits embedded within the income tax regime, we 
may disentangle an existing implicit tax benefit which I call a ‘public equity benefit’. 
This is an unconditional benefit which, through accounting reform, can become the 
basis for a genuine public equity dividend. Importantly, I note that by converting this 
existing implicit benefit into a truly universal dividend, New Zealand can largely avoid 
the problem of having to fund an unconditional universal benefit by reducing other 
allocations of national income or increasing tax rates. The problem of affordability, 
which the public associate with universal benefits, only arises if a society wishes to 
fund significantly larger universal benefits than the benefits already funded.
3. Accounting for New Zealand Income Tax in 2017
The traditional way of accounting for income taxes and benefits is the Graduated Tax 
Conditional Benefit approach, in which different marginal tax rates are attached to different 
income brackets, and transfer benefits have conditions attached to them. Table 1 below shows 
New Zealand’s present graduated income tax scale, and the modified scale announced for 
2018 in the 2017 Budget. While the newly elected government has indicated it will reverse 
these tax threshold changes, this chart demonstrates how public equity benefits change when 
tax thresholds change.
In New Zealand, 33 percent is the top personal rate and also the rate for trusts; I designate 
this the ‘anchor rate’ of income tax. In the familiar graduated tax scale, we may interpret 
the lesser rates – the marginal rates that are applied to lower income brackets – as 
concessional or ‘discounted’ tax rates. 33 percent also used to be the company tax rate. 
12 Before 1988, the anchor rate of income tax was much harder to determine, due to higher top marginal 
rates and – especially before 1978 – many more income brackets. In earlier years – in New Zealand 
especially before 1972 – many benefits were delivered unconditionally as tax allowances, which meant 
that some income might be classed as ‘non-taxable income’. This still happens in, for example, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Our task here is largely unpacking all benefits that are delivered as 
variations in income tax. Reforms in the 1970s (Rankin 2006) only partially unpacked such benefits. 
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Table 1: New Zealand Income Tax Discounts
The reduction of company tax to 28 percent in 2008 suggests there is now a five percent 
(implicit) subsidy on company profits. 
The maximum ‘tax discount’ associated with each income bracket is calculated by 
subtracting each concessional marginal rate (e.g. 10.5%) from the anchor rate (33%), and 
then multiplying by the difference between the upper incomes for the bracket and its 
preceding bracket. For example, the discount for the first income bracket is 22.5% (33% 
minus 10.5%) of $14,000 (which equals $3,150). The discount for the second bracket is 
15.5% (33% minus 17.5%) of $34,000 (equals $5,270). These two discounts combine to 
$8,420, as shown in Table 1. The discount for the third bracket is 3% of $22,000 (equals 
$660). The combined discounts, arising from each of the three concessionary marginal 
tax rates, add up to $9,080 per year or $175 per week (or from Budget 2017, $10,140 per 
year which is $195 per week). The average discounts shown in Table 1 relate to persons 
with gross incomes at the middle of the tax brackets. Thus, a person grossing $59,000 per 
year receives an annual discount of $8,750.
Under the traditional ‘graduated tax’ accounting approach, we would say that persons 
earning $70,000 before tax would pay a portion of their tax at the 10.5% rate, a portion of 
their tax at 17.5% and a portion of their tax at 30%. Their total annual income tax would be 
$14,020 (down to $12,960 in Budget 2017), meaning an after-tax disposable income of 
$55,980. Persons grossing $100,000 would pay an additional portion of tax, at the rate of 
33%. Their total income tax would be $23,920 ($22,860 in Budget 2017), so their after-tax 
income would be $76,080.
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Under the public equity accounting approach proposed here, everybody’s gross market 
income is taxed explicitly at the anchor rate (33%), leaving 67% as their actual market 
income. In addition to their market income, every taxpayer receives an unconditional 
public equity benefit equal to the discount shown in Table 1. For example, a person 
earning $70,000 before tax would incur a tax deduction of $23,100 (33% of $70,000), 
which would leave $46,900 of actual market income, and they would additionally receive 
a public equity benefit of $9,080. In total, this would add up to the same $55,980 of 
disposable income under the traditional account approach.
A person earning $100,000 before tax would receive $67,000 after tax, and receive a 
benefit of $9,080. Their after-tax ‘disposable income’ would be $76,080. The important 
difference is that, under public equity accounting rules, each person would understand 
their personal income as unconditionally coming from two distinct sources: the 
marketplace ($67,000 for persons grossing $100,000), and the public equity fund ($9,080 
equity benefit).
Table 2 shows example accounting differences (using the 2017 tax scale) in relation 
to four taxpayers. Present disposable (after-tax) incomes for each taxpayer are broken 
down into their market and public components.13 Note that – unlike ‘tapering’ income-
tested benefits – unconditional public equity benefits are higher for higher earners.  
Also, many lower earners presently gain total benefits in excess of $9,080 (the present 
maximum public equity benefit). To achieve a genuine public equity dividend of $9,080, 
all economic citizens would need to receive at least $9,080 of public benefit income 
($10,140 in Budget 2017). Once this condition can be assured, the extended  public 
equity benefit becomes both unconditional and universal. It becomes a dividend.
Table 2: Public Equity Benefit in New Zealand
13 Unconditional tax benefits – such as the public equity benefit – reverse-taper, meaning that higher 
income earners receive larger tax benefits than lower income earners. Contrast with those tapering benefits 
today that are commonly labelled ‘tax credits’. Family Tax Credits in New Zealand are ‘transfer benefits’ 
administered by the tax authority. 
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In Table 2, disposable income is calculated either as ‘gross income minus tax’, or as 
‘market income plus public equity benefit’. The only differences are in the accounting 
methodology, and, most importantly, in how the reformed accounting method informs 
the development of future tax rates and benefit distribution. Accounting based on public 
equity principles tells us that all income earners receive, as private incomes available 
for spending, a mix of market-sourced and publicly-sourced income. Public equity 
accounting also tells us that, in New Zealand in 2017, economic citizens earning less than 
$70,000 gain smaller public equity benefits than do those earning $70,000 or more.
Accounting reform affirms that gross public revenue – the public equity fund – represents 
a larger share of GDP than we traditionally suppose it to be (Table 3). For 2017, we can 
see that the corrected public revenue represents 45.7 percent of GDP, not 31.7 percent. If 
productivity rises, for example through increased automation, this percentage should rise 
also.14  
Table 3: Public Equity Fund, New Zealand Budget 2017
We can say, in 2017, that almost every economic citizen is a public beneficiary. All who pay 
income tax receive a public equity benefit, while almost everyone who gains no market 
income receives some other sort of benefit from public revenue, such as a Jobseekers 
Benefit or a Working for Families Tax Credit. The universalist viewpoint which underpins 
public equity accounting suggests that every economic citizen should draw at least as 
much from public revenue as higher earning economic citizens are unconditionally entitled 
to. Thus, in 2017, anyone whose total annual benefits (including their public equity 
benefit) falls short of $9,080 incurs an injustice, in much the same sense that company 
shareholders denied their full dividend entitlements would be subject to an injustice.
14 Consider the extreme case, where a country‘s entire labour output is able to be performed by one 
person. The anchor rate of income tax would need to be at least 99 percent in order to avoid excess 
inequality. While the extreme case will never happen, it is important to have an accounting method that can 
handle any conceptually possible labour-capital ratio. Indeed, if as a society we favour working less and 
consuming less, then the labour-capital ratio declines further, meaning a higher anchor tax rate is required 
to avert increased inequality. 
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New Zealanders are used to the idea that all economic citizens should receive public 
benefits. New Zealand has a history, since 1940, of universal public superannuation. And, 
for four decades since 1946, New Zealand had a universal mothers’ benefit called the 
Family Benefit. Furthermore, New Zealanders are used to the idea that school education 
and acute healthcare are publicly funded and available to all. The public equity principle 
– that we pay taxes on an equitable basis and all receive something back on an equitable 
basis – is not a distant concept to New Zealanders. The word ‘benefit’ means ‘good’; it is 
good to be a beneficiary.
4. The Stages of Tax-Benefit Reform
In this section, I describe the conceptual stages of possible reforms guided by the public 
equity principles described above. Democratic reforms must be conducted in stages, and 
the first stage should always be to remove the fear of change. Reform here begins with 
a reinterpretation of income tax, including the recognition that existing benefits, hidden 
from view by accounting conventions that are past their ‘use-by’ date, already form the 
basis of an unconditional and universal public dividend. An equal sharing of the public 
component of national income can become the centrepiece of the reform that capitalism 
itself must have if it is to survive.
Stage 1: Public Equity Accounting
The first stage is an accounting reform, a relabelling exercise that adopts the language 
of public equity accounting by identifying public equity benefits as tax benefits, thereby 
enabling an alternative understanding of progressive income tax. Accounting reform 
is the creative essence of the process outlined here. Until such reform is undertaken, 
attempts to graft a Universal Basic Income into the present public accounting structure 
as a grand political exercise in income redistribution, are most likely doomed to failure. 
This is the usual fate of ‘big-bang’ revolutionary change imposed by governments. The 
underlying ideas of public equity accounting are not political. Rather they serve as a road 
map for future income distribution under capitalism; an application to present reality of 
imagination and good arithmetic. Reforms informed by simple and relevant accounting 
insights need not be politically divisive. 
The public equity benefit represents a reconceptualisation of the benefits that arise from 
discounted rates of income tax in a graduated tax scale. The income brackets subject 
to discounted marginal tax rates in New Zealand were shown in Table 1. The anchor tax 
rate is 33%. The concessional (discounted) rates are 10.5%, 17.5% and 30%. By way of 
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contrast, in Australia the equivalent anchor tax rate is 37%, and the discounted rates are 
0%, 19% and 32.5%. In the United Kingdom, the anchor rate is 40%; discount rates are 0% 
(expressed through a system of variable allowances) and 20%. 
Figure 1
Figure 1 shows the way that, in New Zealand, public equity benefits sit on top of market 
sourced disposable income. To accumulate the maximum public equity benefit, economic 
citizens of New Zealand must be earning at least $70,000 per year before tax. The 
first chunk of public equity benefit shown amounts to $3,150; it is payable to anyone 
earning at least $14,000. The first and second chunks together add to $8,420, an amount 
unconditionally payable to anyone earning at least $48,000 per year. The final sliver of 
$660 – the third ‘chunk’ – takes the maximum public equity benefit to $9,080, which is 
$175 per week.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 below shows how the present maximum public equity 
benefit ($9,080) could instead be made available to all taxpayers on gross incomes above 
$48,000. This would involve an alternative tax scale that replaces the 10.5% concessional 
tax rate with a zero rate, removes the 30% concessional rate, and reduces the $14,000 
income tax threshold. This extension of the public equity benefit looks like an option that 
cc By Keith Rankin
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would be a good fit for the new centre-left government (Rankin 2017), as an alternative to 
the changes (likely to be reversed) legislated by the previous centre-right government in 
Budget 2017. It would only provide ‘tax cuts’ – that is, public equity benefit increases – to 
people grossing less than $70,000 per year.
Figure 2
Figure 3 below conflates the information in Figures 1 and 2, showing the levels of 
unconditional public equity benefit presently payable to people with different levels of 
gross income, up to $100,000. Figure 3 also shows the difference that the alternative 
income tax scale, depicted in Figure 2, would make.
cc By Keith Rankin
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Figure 3
 
The change for 2018 legislated in Budget 2017, – but which will most likely be reversed by 
the new coalition government – is represented in Figure 4. It shows the maximum public 
equity benefit rising from $175 to $195 per week.
Figure 4
 
• Disposable Income = 67% of Gross Market Income + public equity dividend ($175) + 
Other Benefits
‘Other Benefits’ is now defined as any level of social assistance benefits in excess of the 
public equity dividend. While for most people ‘Other Benefits’ would be zero, for some – 
cc By Keith Rankin
cc By Keith Rankin
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In New Zealand, the present maximum public equity benefit is $9,080 ($175 per week) 
for persons grossing at least $70,000 per year. In Australia the maximum public equity 
benefit works out (in $AUD) at $12,368 (or $238 per week) for persons grossing between 
$87,000 and $180,000 (a lower public equity benefit for other incomes). And in the 
United Kingdom, based on that country’s present scale of marginal tax rates, the public 
equity benefit is £10,800 (or £208 per week) for persons on a basic tax free allowance of 
£11,000 and grossing between £43,000 and £161,000 (a lower public equity benefit for 
other incomes).
Stage 2: Public Equity Dividends
While Stage 1 of public equity reforms re-imagines the tax-benefit interface, Stage 2 
increases some people’s incomes. This stage of the proposed reforms converts public 
equity benefits into public equity dividends. This is a straightforward application of the 
principle of horizontal equity – that is, to treat equals equally. Accordingly, all economic 
citizens are equal in a public sense; all equally own, and have an equal stake in, the public 
equity fund. It’s economic democracy: one economic citizen, one dividend.
This reform requires, firstly, that economic citizens who presently receive total monetary 
benefits (public equity benefits plus transfer benefits) of less than $175 per week gain 
a benefit top-up to $175. This top up would ensure that all economic citizens receive 
a minimum of $175 per week of publicly sourced (benefit) income from the public 
equity fund. For some people, such as financially dependent spouses and some fulltime 
students, the top-up would be the full $175 per week.
Once everybody has a minimum total monetary benefit of $175 per week, the conditions 
for a public equity dividend are met. The first $175 of all persons’ benefits becomes 
an unconditional and universal publicly sourced income. Benefit income more than 
the public equity dividend remains, subject to the unchanged conditions. For fulltime 
workers, public equity dividends could be paid – as public equity benefits are now – by 
employers from funds not remitted to Inland Revenue. The mechanism of payment to 
precarious workers and students would most likely be in the form of a regular credit from 
the tax authority (in the New Zealand context, Inland Revenue). Present ‘beneficiaries’ – in 
the sense we use that term today – could continue to receive their payments from Work 
and Income. 
With a weekly public equity dividend of $175, and an anchor tax rate of 33 percent, every 
economic citizen’s income conforms with the following formula:
• Disposable Income = 67% of Gross Market Income + public equity dividend ($175) + 
Other Benefits
‘Other Benefits’ is now defined as any level of social assistance benefits in excess of the 
public equity dividend. While for most people ‘Other Benefits’ would be zero, for some -
17
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such as low-middle-income families (especially single-parent families), low-middle-income 
people with high accommodation costs, retired persons, and persons with significant 
disabilities – ‘Other Benefits’ would continue to be an important part of their disposable 
incomes. The public equity dividend is a correct application of the principle of horizontal 
equity. ‘Other Benefits’, on the other hand, represent an application of the principle of 
vertical equity – that is, unequal benefits for people facing unequal circumstances.
Following Stage 2 reforms, ‘Other Benefits’ would be calculated and administered 
exactly as at present. This is not to argue that present benefit levels are sufficient to 
meet the needs of beneficiaries. Rather, the resetting of present ‘Other Benefits’ as new 
social assistance benefit is addressed here as Stage 5 reform. The stages – as presented 
– should be understood as conceptual and not necessarily a chronological sequence. 
Raising ‘Other Benefits’ can be done at any time, and not necessarily as a part of reforms 
informed by public equity principles. Many people classed in 2017 as beneficiaries – such 
as young unemployed people without dependents – would cease to be clients of Work 
and Income. For them, the public equity dividend would become their only publicly-
sourced benefit.
Stage 3: Future-Proofing Benefits using Public Equity Principles
Stage 3 reform requires principles to determine how both public equity parameters – the 
anchor tax rate (33% initially) and the public equity dividend ($175 per week initially) – 
adjust over time.
The basic principle for adjusting transfer benefits has been inflation.15 This form of 
indexation would be insufficient, however, because the public equity dividend should 
capture productivity gains. The public equity dividend is a public dividend which should 
adjust sufficiently to ensure that productivity gains do not themselves become reasons 
for inequality or exploitation. Where productivity gains are due largely to public capital 
improvements – for example, from intellectual or social capital – then the anchor tax rate 
would also need to increase, raising the size of the public equity dividend relative to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).
One possibility is that the public equity dividend automatically adjusts for prices, and the 
public equity dividend and anchor tax rate are politically adjusted periodically to 
reflect both productivity gains and labour requirements. If ever there are general labour 
shortages (as distinct from shortages of specific labour skills), then public equity dividends 
could be held rather than raised, increasing the ‘elasticity of labour supply’. In periods 
(such as recessions) with higher productivity of employed labour and general labour 
15 If we inflation-adjust the 1914 old-age pension (£26 per year; New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1915), we 
get less than $80 per week in 2017. That amount falls far short of today’s universal public pension of about 
$300 per week. Over long time periods, only adjusting for inflation is demonstrably inadequate. I also note 
that, when a Personal Tax Rebate – another form of Proto-UBI – was introduced in New Zealand in 1974, 
failure to properly index this unconditional benefit paid to all workers facilitated its demise in 1978 (Rankin, 
2006). 
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surpluses, then a higher public equity dividend and a higher anchor tax rate would both 
forestall increased inequality and, by allowing people to keep spending, would facilitate 
a return to more usual macroeconomic conditions. The (anchor) tax rate would need to 
be adjusted to whatever level was needed to fund the public equity dividend at its new 
appropriate level.16
Another indexing possibility is that the public equity dividend would automatically link 
to GDP per person. While this would allow automatic adjustment to both inflation and 
productivity, it would in itself not create the fiscal stimulus required during a recession. 
Nor would it reflect that, in a world of increasingly automated production, the public 
equity fund would need to become a greater share of GDP, as labour incomes would 
represent a diminishing share of GDP. Indexation to GDP would fall short of the goal of 
maintaining a stable (or decreasing) Gini Coefficient.17 
In a 2011 essay I discussed the situation whereby an economy with high and growing 
productivity could result in either of two outcome types: a ‘high-GDP high-work’ type or 
a ‘lower-GDP lower-work’ type. In the absence of public equity dividends (which I called 
‘refundable tax credits’ in that essay), capitalism can only achieve the first outcome type, 
which is more resource consumptive and therefore less environmentally sustainable. 
The high-GDP-high-work type is tantamount to a high growth economy, in which inputs 
as well as outputs grow. The lower-GDP-lower-work type is a potentially sustainable 
economy which eschews the more-work more-factories model. In the absence of public 
equity dividends, only high (indeed rising) levels of labour employment can offset 
growing inequality. However, a society with public equity dividends, by choosing higher 
dividends and a higher tax rate, can steer itself towards the second, more environmentally 
sustainable outcome type.
In a mature fiscal environment, with income distribution informed by public equity 
principles, key parameters would be politically contestable. Automatic benefit indexing 
alone would be insufficient to ensure a result that optimises economic efficiency and 
distributional equity. Presumably political parties of the left would look to raise the income 
tax rate to fund increased collective goods and increased equity dividends. Parties of the 
political right would normally favour a smaller public equity fund relative to GDP than 
would left-wing parties.
16 An exception to this rule is the possibility that public finance follows a structural deficit model, much as 
we already see in Japan and the United States. (In this model, the government is technically insolvent, in 
perpetuity, nevertheless in an economically sustainable way. Refer Koo, 2009.) While this may prove to be 
an increasingly common fiscal model in the twenty-first century, its discussion is out of the scope of the 
present report. 
17 The Gini Coefficient is the most common measure of income distribution; the higher the Coefficient 
the more income inequality a society has. Liberal capitalist (Western, developed) economies have 
become more unequal in recent decades. Governments which delay Public Equity reforms until their Gini 
Coefficients are much too high, will need to have a public equity dividend indexing policy that steadily 
reduces their Gini Coefficient until an acceptable measure is achieved. 
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Stage 4: Taxation Before Distribution
Stage 4 sees the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system of income tax collection reach its logical 
historical endpoint, with all income tax deducted at market source, and all private incomes 
paid out of funds that have already been taxed.
Historical convention has been to distribute income as if it was all private income, then for 
the government to take back arbitrary shares as public revenue. This reflects the historical 
epochs during which income tax was introduced, and the ensuing pragmatics of paying 
implicit benefits through tax graduation. However, this traditional accounting approach 
lends credence to the extreme libertarian view that income tax is the public appropriation 
of private wealth. Further, the variability of tax rates incentivises tax avoidance. Following 
Stage 1 reform above, however, every person and every organisation is technically liable 
for the same proportion (e.g. 33%) of their gross income as tax. With a single tax rate, 
domestic tax avoidance becomes practically impossible as differences in tax rates cannot 
be exploited. (International tax avoidance would require an international application of 
public equity accounting.) 
Figure 5 below shows how market income distribution to wage/salary earners – in this 
example, Bob, Anne, Ted, and Fran – would look after both Stage 1 and Stage 4 reform. 
In the ‘before distribution’ case, all employee income is distributed gross, as if it was all 
private income, and 33 percent from Bob, Anne, Ted, and Fran each is then obligated 
to Inland Revenue. In the ‘after distribution’ case, the 33 percent (less any subsidies on 
company tax) is committed prior to being allocated to firms’ employees’ salaries. Thus 
Bob, Anne, Ted and Fran all understand their market wages/salaries as being net of 
income tax.18 Under these accounting circumstances, they no longer perceive themselves 
as facing a marginal tax rate on their market incomes. Each understands that they will 
receive a salary paid out of already taxed income, plus a dividend ($175 per week) from 
public revenue.
18  With this understanding, they will no longer be able to claim that they work 3.5 days per week for 
themselves and 1.5 days for the government. Essentially the concept of ‘before-tax wages’ would 
disappear. 
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Figure 5
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Once all income is taxed at a single rate, income tax is easily understood as a production 
tax – indeed a production ‘royalty’ – in which all producers pay a flat rate levy for their use 
of economic inputs that belong in the public domain.19  Thus producers would contribute 
33 percent (or whatever else the tax rate might become) of the value their activities 
contribute to the economy’s output to the public equity fund, and only then pay their 
workers, shareholders and creditors.
When income is fully taxed in this manner (‘at source’), marginal rates of income tax 
disappear. Present concern about marginal tax rates would be revealed to be an artefact 
of an outdated accounting system that initially attributes public income to private entities.
We might also note that Anne in Figure 5 is better placed to negotiate a higher wage (or 
‘market income’) than she was pre-reform. If she refuses to accept a low wage, now she 
has her public equity benefit (that is, an unconditional $175 per week) as of right, which 
can tide her over until she gets a satisfactory offer.
Stage 5: Social Assistance Benefits
One of the reasons that a Universal Basic Income is attractive to many people is the 
possibility of abolishing the intrusive and expensive bureaucracy that comes with 
‘tapered’ – that is, income tested and abating – benefits.
The problem here is that, if governments abolish all conditional and tapering benefits, 
we no longer have a way of providing social assistance to those with particular needs. 
In particular, we would not be able to address needs that arise from age, disability (of 
oneself or of one’s dependents), parenthood (especially sole parenthood), education 
requirements, housing, or indebtedness.20 
The principle of vertical equity – treating people with different circumstances differently 
– is not antithetical to that of horizontal equity, as is sometimes supposed.21 Rather, the 
two principles can be complementary. Social assistance transfer benefits allow a fiscally 
affordable public equity dividend to be paid as a universal benefit. Whereas the public 
equity dividend can be the core entitlement of equitable tax benefit integration, social 
assistance is that reform’s necessary superstructure.
While minimising the need for special assistance, the challenge is to offer it with 
compassion while removing the perverse incentives – poverty traps – that disable today’s 
beneficiaries from finding their own solutions to the economic challenges that they may face. 
19 In Rankin (2013), I discuss the ownership of water – a very topical issue in New Zealand in 2017 – in the 
wider context of water being an important public domain resource. 
20 We worry a lot about ‘moral hazard’ associated with indebtedness. In Stuff (2017), Work and Income 
argue that “bank loans should [be] treated as income” for means-testing purposes. Rather, the safety-net 
principle – that nobody should fall through social welfare ‘cracks’ – should apply to people with debts, 
and notwithstanding the circumstances in which debts were incurred. If people need help to avoid dire 
economic and social outcomes associated with excessive debt, then some kind of help should be available. 
Bankruptcy will sometimes be a solution, but not always. 
21 Morgan and Guthrie (2011) regard horizontal equity and vertical equity as alternatives, not 
complements. 
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The suggested reform here is to accrete the various forms of assistance provided from 
the public equity fund, and to apply a single tapered income test to that assistance. A new 
and sensitive income-abatement formula would be required to displace existing means 
testing, possibly following a points system comparable to that used by Immigration New 
Zealand.  This social assistance benefit should be as easily available to self-employed 
people as to people who identify as employees.
Social assistance benefit recipients should only face one regime of benefit-abatement. 
With some people currently facing enforceable levies such as student loan repayments 
and Child Support, there can be no realistic capacity to reduce social assistance 
through separate abatements of Work and Income benefits, Family Tax Credits, and 
Accommodation Supplements. While student loan repayments and Child Support 
payments may themselves be amenable to further reform, it is not the role of public equity 
reform to incorporate these specific and separate matters. (Certainly, while Child Support 
payments should be paid always to caregiving parents, consideration for social assistance 
would take such matters into account.) Further, the ‘living allowance’ component of the Student 
Loan scheme would naturally become redundant with the advent of public equity dividends.
The reforms advocated here are agnostic on the matter of universal benefits for children. 
The important issue is that caregiving mothers and fathers receiving public equity 
dividends as of right become less in need of child benefits. However, the number of 
dependent children a parent has would be an important consideration for setting the 
level of social assistance, as it is for present Working for Families benefits. A benefit 
programme of universal public equity dividends and tapering social assistance benefits 
can be workable, affordable, and equitable to all types of family. The potentially costly 
addition and complication of universal child benefits should not become an issue that 
impedes the core reforms. However, reformed Child Support legislation, with minimal 
incentives for parents to spend income on legal professionals, and with all Child Support 
money serving its putative purpose (and not benefit recovery purposes, as at present), 
may be a useful complement to the core reforms.
With respect to age benefits, some may argue that a public equity dividend is a sufficient 
universal benefit for the elderly, and that any additional retirement benefit should come 
under the rubric of social assistance. My sense is that, at least in New Zealand’s post-1938 
tradition of universal superannuation, all persons over 65 should continue to receive a 
universal Superannuation benefit over and above the public equity dividend. The present 
‘married’ payment of New Zealand Superannuation is close to $300 per week for a person 
without other income. It suggests that a universal superannuation of about $125 per week 
(or 70 to 75 percent of the public equity dividend) should be payable additionally to 
economic citizens over qualifying age, over and above their public equity dividends. This 
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would lead to a reduction of average benefit levels payable to some older people – given 
that many people of pension-entitlement-age are employed and receive both public 
equity benefits and New Zealand Superannuation – and could help to fund the dividend 
top-ups required in the Stage 2 reform.
Universal superannuation acknowledges that age does come with higher need for 
some services (especially healthcare services, as private health insurance becomes 
unaffordable). And it recognises past contributions to present productivity – be they 
through labour, caregiving, or the many other unaccounted for sacrifices (including 
having endured unemployment) – that economic citizens make. For persons over 65 living 
without a partner, who presently gain a premium on their superannuation entitlement, that 
premium might be better regarded as tapered social assistance (social assistance benefit).
5. Productivity, Labour Supply, and Sustainability
Reforms such as those listed above are recommended if liberal capitalist societies are to 
meet the distributional challenges of rising economic productivity. Such societies require 
adequate – indeed more than adequate – spending capacity on the part of the ordinary 
(especially middle decile) people who constitute the markets for the ‘wage goods’ whose 
production is the hallmark of liberal capitalism. If the system cannot distribute income 
to those for whom these goods and services are designated, then the whole capitalist 
edifice eventually fails. Such failure is delayed only by a spiralling indebtedness that 
compensates to some extent – and only temporarily – for failures of income distribution.
In the process of meeting the distributional challenges needed to sustain liberal 
capitalism, ordinary people receiving public equity dividends are able to make labour 
supply choices – work leisure trade offs – that they cannot make when systemically 
inadequate wages and loans are their only sources of purchasing power. Maintaining 
a more elastic labour supply – with people working shorter hours in normal times and 
longer hours in times of national emergency – is the key to the sustainability of the natural 
environment as well as the sustainability of capitalism itself.
Income security in high productivity societies is neither unaffordable nor a luxury. Rather, 
income security extends the core liberal capitalist concept of ‘consumer sovereignty’ 
to sovereignty over household time as well as over consumer choices. A mature liberal 
capitalist society that acknowledges and values public equity has a mechanism to recycle 
income to all its equity holder households in such a way that they can make genuine 
choices about spending and sustainable living. Liberal capitalist governments can adjust 
the core fiscal parameters – especially the anchor tax rate and the size of the public equity 
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dividend – to ensure that nobody is left behind, and that nobody is forced to enter into 
exploitative labour contracts or self-employment in the criminal economy.
Public equity is our best means to keep in circulation the money that represents 
our disposable incomes, and that atrophies when concentrated in private hoards. 
Public equity represents capitalism’s happy liberal future. Capitalism begets other 
futures, illiberal futures, if we do not have the imagination – or if we are too cynical – to 
acknowledge and protect our public property rights.
Our necessary public discussion of a Universal Basic Income can progress much more 
smoothly if informed by public equity principles, and by our realisation that the public 
equity benefit which we already fund is itself the core of a future dividend payable to 
every economic citizen.
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Appendix - Why I No Longer Favour the Name ‘Universal 
Basic Income’
In 1991 I wrote advocating ‘a universal tax credit available to every adult - the Universal 
Basic Income (UBI) - and a moderately high flat tax rate’. In 1996 (Rankin, 1996) I started 
to develop these ideas into a “social accounting framework”. It was after this 1996 
presentation – in Vienna, Austria – that the name ‘Universal Basic Income’ became a 
popular choice, among a number of other names, for the concept of a universal publicly-
sourced income payable equally to all citizens.
I now choose to de-emphasise the name Universal Basic Income; a name that, in the 
present debate, has come, to too many people, to represent an unaffordable utopian 
benefit that undermines the work thrift ethos that they believe underpins progressive 
capitalism. Furthermore, Universal Basic Income is sometimes presented as a benefit 
to replace all other benefits – a maximum as well as a minimum benefit – meaning that 
people with special needs may be denied public help in meeting those needs. That was 
never my intention.
By focusing on a dividend derived from public equity, I am distinguishing my schema 
from some other proposed UBI models. I am also highlighting that this model is not 
centered around a concept of welfare but on a citizenship right to the dividends of past 
public investments. 
Atkinson (1995) contrasted the ‘conditional benefit, graduated tax’ approach with the 
alternative ‘[universal] basic income, flat tax approach’. We should note that the academic 
‘basic income flat tax’ approach (which, in practice, requires an anchor tax rate of 30% 
as a bare minimum) is quite different from the similar sounding ‘flat tax, wage top-up’ 
proposal made by New Zealand’s Minister of Finance – Roger Douglas – in December 
1987. Douglas proposed to minimise the public share of national income, while paying 
highly abated means-tested wage supplements to a select group of low-income working 
families.
We should also note that conditional benefits create a ‘moral hazard’ problem, in that, 
in order to receive such benefits, people have incentives to manage their lives so as to 
conform with those conditions, or at least to appear to be conforming. (This is like the 
‘tax avoidance’ problem noted in the main text.) It is a complete misunderstanding for 
commentators (for example, Easton 2015; Hooton 2017) to liken a UBI to a scheme like 
Douglas’ Guaranteed Minimum Family Income: a transfer benefit, tightly targeted to low-
income wage-earners, that would abate at an effective marginal tax rate of 100%. Under 
the Douglas proposal, most economic citizens would gain precisely zero publicly-sourced 
income. It was the antithesis of a Universal Basic Income.
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Even a very low public equity dividend – too low to be classed as a Universal Basic Income 
– would be useful if it allows us as a society to open the door to future change, to bring 
meaningful and substantial equity dividends into the realm of the ‘adjacent possible’. 
In 1938 the promise of a $20 per year universal superannuation in 1940 both gave the 
then Labour Government a record electoral victory, and gave us today the universal 
public pension (New Zealand Superannuation) that largely eradicated the indignity of 
elderly poverty in New Zealand. The key to the door is our recognition that, through 
concessionary rates of income tax, all New Zealand taxpayers are also beneficiaries; and 
that it is a good thing to be a beneficiary of public equity. 
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Glossary
Abatement Rate: the rate at which a ‘transfer benefit’ is reduced when a person gains an 
extra dollar of gross market income.
Actual Market Income: a person’s gross market income, less the anchor rate of income 
tax.
Adult: a person who has attained the age of economic responsibility, whatever age that 
might be set to be.
Anchor Rate of Income Tax: the tax rate that anchors a country’s traditional income tax 
scale. It may be understood as the ‘non-concessionary’ rate. In New Zealand’s case, it is 
the top personal rate (which is also the trust rate) that has anchored the scale for almost 
three decades. In most countries, in practice, the anchor rate will be the marginal rate 
for a person earning twice the average wage. In a country that adopts public equity 
accounting, the anchor rate becomes the only rate of income tax. Contrast ‘Concessionary 
Rate’ and ‘Elite Rate’. The present anchor rate might not be the optimum anchor rate. The 
present rate is a result of historical accident.
Benefit: any explicit or implicit payment of publicly-sourced income to economic citizens.
Concessionary Rate of Income Tax: any rate (including zero) on a graduated tax scale that 
represents a concession, and hence a form of benefit. It is always less than the Anchor 
Rate. Contrast the Anchor Rate and the Elite Rate.
Disposable Income: the amount of money-income that a person or household has 
available to spend, and to meet obligations such as debt-servicing.
Economic Citizen: Someone who would qualify for a public equity dividend. Economic 
citizens should be adults, and ideally every adult in the world would be an economic 
citizen of one (and only one) sovereign nation. Being an economic citizen is not tied to the 
individual’s economic contribution.
Effective Marginal Tax Rate: percentage of a person’s next dollar of earnings ceded to 
government by way of personal taxation, benefit abatement, or other compulsory levy.
Elasticity of Labour Supply: the responsiveness of the adult population to increased 
requirement for labour.
Elite Rate of Income Tax: any rate on a traditional graduated tax scale that is above the 
Anchor Rate, and that applies to an elite group of high-earning economic citizens. New 
Zealand does not have an Elite Rate (in 2017), but did in the 2000s’ decade.
Family Benefit: a universal benefit paid to all mothers in New Zealand – and to fathers 
acting in lieu of mothers – from 1946-91. Payment was on a per child basis. The Family 
Benefit could be capitalised, for example to contribute to a deposit on a family home.
28
Public Equity and Tax-Benefit Reform.
Gini Coefficient: the most widely used measure of income inequality.
Graduated Income Tax: traditional way of accounting for income taxes by levying lower 
marginal tax rates on lower income brackets.
Gross Market Income: a person’s untaxed income from market sources.
Gross Public Revenue: see Public Equity Fund.
Horizontal Equity: the citizenship principle, of treating equals equally. Contrast vertical 
equity.
Income Bracket: a range of incomes; for example, from $10,001 to $20,000.
Income Tax Discount: a tax benefit that arises from the levying of lower (discounted) 
marginal tax rates on lower income brackets.
Labour-Capital Ratio: the balance between labour income (arising from what work we 
do) and capital income (arising from the six capitals that we own). Rising productivity and 
improved work-life balance both lower this ratio.
Marginal Tax Rate: the tax rate applied to the next $1 of a person’s gross market income.
Moral Hazard: socially adverse behaviour adopted as an unintended response to market, 
insurance or government incentives.
National Income: all income created, in a period of one year, within the jurisdiction of a 
nation state. In essence, national income is gross domestic product (GDP) seen from a 
distributional perspective.
Other Benefits: transfer benefits paid in a society that pays all economic citizens a public 
equity dividend. Refer to social assistance benefits.
Poverty Trap: situation of low-income dependency, where any attempt by persons to 
increase their market incomes is met by a substantial loss of access to publicly-sourced 
income.
Precarious Workers: persons in the labour force without a stable principal job or business, 
sometimes called ‘casual workers’. In my thesis about the labour market during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Rankin, 1990), I called this (then very large) group of people the 
‘residual workforce’. Standing (2014) refers to this group of workers as ‘the Precariat’.
Public Equity Accounting: the incorporation of public equity principles into national 
accounting processes.
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Public Equity Benefit: one component of the implicit public dividend (which exists at 
present in all liberal democracy nations), paid as an unconditional tax concession. The 
other component, presently conditional, is the ‘social welfare safety net’.
Public Equity Dividend: an explicit, equal, universal and unconditional payment to all 
economic citizens, funded by taxing all income at the anchor rate.
Public Equity Fund: gross public revenue, when applying public equity accounting 
principles.
Public Property Rights: the property rights – including the right to gain an income – 
relating to a society collectively rather than to that society’s economic citizens individually.
Six Capitals: natural, manufactured, financial, human, intellectual, and socio-cultural 
capital.
Social Assistance Benefit: needs-based transfer benefit paid in a society that pays all 
economic citizens a public equity dividend; conceptually similar to the present UK 
Universal Credit.
Social Welfare Safety Net: the principle and practice that all economic citizens have 
access to a minimum level of provision, paid where necessary from public revenue.
Structural Unemployment: unemployment that can exist even in a strong labour market, 
due to such things as insufficient skills, potential workers living too far from possible 
places of employment, or to conditional transfer benefits being structured so as to 
penalise people who take on precarious employment. Structural unemployment creates 
low elasticity of labour supply.
Tapering of Benefits: also known as ‘income abatement’, or benefit ‘claw-backs’. The 
process of reducing transfer benefits when a person’s or a household’s market-sourced 
income increases. Whereas the abatement rate is the amount of benefit lost with 
additional market income, the rate of taper is the amount of benefit retained.
Tax-Benefit: any form of publicly-sourced monetary benefit paid in the form of income tax 
concessions or exemptions.
Tax-Credit: a label given to a transfer benefit that is administered by a country’s taxation 
authority. In New Zealand, that authority is the Inland Revenue Department (IRD).
Transfer Benefits: conditional or income-tested publicly-sourced payments to individuals 
or families. In New Zealand, most transfer benefits are administered by Work and Income 
New Zealand, an agency of the Ministry of Social Development.
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Universal Basic Income (UBI): a public equity dividend sufficiently high to displace many 
transfer benefits.
Universal Credit: British ‘tapered’ transfer benefit which covers a range of contingencies 
that may require people to seek social assistance.
Universal Superannuation: an unconditional payment, payable since 1940 to all persons 
aged over 65 (subject to limited residency conditions). In 1977 it was reinvented as 
National Superannuation, and payable to persons aged over 60. In 2017 it is called New 
Zealand Superannuation, and the age of eligibility is 65.
Vertical Equity: the positive discrimination principle, treating unequals unequally. Contrast 
horizontal equity.
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